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Abstract
This paper investigates a general relationship between risk and time pref-
erences. I consider a decision maker who chooses a one-time consumption. I
assume however, that he believes both that today’s good is certain, and that, as
the promised date for future goods becomes increasingly distant, the probability
of his consuming the goods decreases continuously to zero. For example, the
probability might be the subjective mortality rate of a decision maker or the ob-
jective hazard rate of future goods. Under the assumptions speciﬁed above, the
present paper shows that (i) a decision maker exhibits the common ratio eﬀect
if and only if he discounts hyperbolically; (ii) he exhibits the certainty eﬀect if
and only if he discounts quasi-hyperbolically; and (iii) he exhibits the expected
utility if and only if he is temporally unbiased (an exponential discounter).
Keywords: Allais paradox; hyperbolic discounting; preference over lotteries;
intertemporal consumption.
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11 Introduction
Conventional wisdom recognizes that the future is uncertain in many respects. Several
researchers, therefore, have claimed that there should be a relationship between risk and
time preferences. Based on this intuition, they have tried to explain future discounting
on the basis of the uncertainty associated with future payoﬀs. These approaches are
not completely satisfactory, however, because each paper imposes diﬀerent restrictive
assumptions on utility functions and the probability functions representing the future
uncertainty. It is therefore diﬃcult to identify the fundamental relationship between
risk and time preferences.1
The purpose of the present paper is to establish a general theory on the relationship
between risk and time preferences, without assuming speciﬁc forms of utility functions
and probability distributions. To achieve this purpose as simply as possible, I consider
a decision maker who chooses a one-time consumption. However, he discounts the
future payoﬀ because it is uncertain whether he can consume it or not. I assume a
weak condition on the probability function representing the uncertainty. This condition
means that today’s good is certain, but as the promised date for future goods becomes
increasingly distant, the probability of consuming the goods decreases continuously to
zero. I call the above property regular. For example, if the probability reﬂects the
decision maker’s subjective mortality rate or an objective hazard rate for future goods,
the regular condition would be reasonable.
The theorem of this paper shows the following: (i) a decision maker exhibits the
common ratio eﬀect if and only if he discounts hyperbolically; (ii) he exhibits the cer-
tainty eﬀect if and only if he discounts quasi-hyperbolically; and (iii) he exhibits the
expected utility if and only if he is temporally unbiased (an exponential discounter).
One implication of the theorem would be that the certain delivery of present goods
makes subjects present biased. This implication is compatible with the experimen-
tal evidence found by Keren and Roelofsma (1995), which ﬁnds that a present bias
disappears when the outcome become uncertain.
Since most of the conventional research satisﬁes the regularity condition, the present
paper may be viewed as a generalization of that research. In particular, parts (i)
and (ii) of the theorem are a signiﬁcant generalization of Halevy (2008) and Epper
et al. (2009).2 Although some authors (such as, Loewenstein and Prelec (1992))
had suggested an analogy between risk and time preferences, the precise relationship
between the two had not been formally studied until Halevy (2008). Both Halevy (2008)
and Epper et al. (2009) assume a constant Poisson mortality rate. Halevy (2008) shows,
within a class of Yarri (1987)’s rank-dependent utilities, that the common ratio eﬀect
1For example, many papers are only interested in ﬁnding the speciﬁc probability (hazard) function
to describe hyperbolic discounting, under the implicit assumption of expected utility theory. So in this
sense, they study only the one-way relationship from expected utility theory to hyperbolic discounting.
2I learned of Epper et al. (2009) after the present paper had been completed and presented.
2implies quasi-hyperbolic discounting.3 Epper et al.(2009) shows the same result within
a class of utilities of Prelec (1998)’s prospect theory. In the present paper, I drop any
restriction on the preferences and the assumption of a constant Poisson mortality rate.
Nevertheless, thanks to the ﬂexibility of the model, I can generalize the conclusion.
Under the aforementioned regularity condition on probability function, I obtain three
relationships between risk and time preferences. The “only if” component of part (ii)
of the theorem implies the conclusion about the relationship between risk and time
preferences drawn in both Halevy (2008) and Epper et al. (2009), because hyperbolic
discounting entails quasi-hyperbolic discounting.
Part (iii) of the theorem implies that the hazard function approach of “explain-
ing” deviations from exponential discounting by assuming that prizes are not received
with some probability but otherwise using a standard expected utility model, as is
currently prevalent in psychology and biology, cannot succeed. For example, Kagel et
al. (1986) and Green and Myerson (1996) argue that the decreasing rate of the Pois-
son hazard rate over time leads to hyperbolic discounting.4 However, part (iii) of the
theorem shows that this approach must lead to temporally unbiased preferences, i.e.,
to dynamic consistency. That is because the probability (survival) function deﬁned
from the hazard function satisﬁes the regularity condition of this paper. In fact, most
researchers who adopt the hazard function approach describe a preference reversal in
static decision making, but not in dynamic decision making.5 In contrast, the theorem
herein suggests two ways of using a hazard function approach to successfully describe
dynamic inconsistency. One is to assume non-regular uncertainty, such as uncertainty
about the timing of consumption (as in, Dasgupta and Maskin (2005)). The other is
to assume nonexpected utility, such as rank dependent utilities (as in, Halevy (2008))
or prospect theory (as in, Epper et al. (2009)), or-as part (ii) of the theorem shows
more generally-assuming the common ratio eﬀect.
The present paper also sheds light on certain aspects of static decision making, as
discussed in Baucells and Heukamp (2008), in which a speciﬁc representation of prefer-
ences over lotteries with delay is obtained. Their representation suggests a relationship
between the common ratio eﬀect and the common diﬀerence eﬀect (a preference reversal
3Halevy (2008) claims that the common ratio eﬀect is equivalent to quasi-hyperbolic discounting.
However, one direction of the equivalence (quasi-hyperbolic discounting ⇒ the common ration eﬀect)
turns out to be false. I will explain this point in the appendix.
4Sozou (1998) oﬀers an alternative theory in which that the hazard rate is constant but unknown
to the decision maker.
5As Dasgupta and Maskin (2005) point out, there are two distinct meanings for the term “hy-
perbolic discounting.” One applies to dynamic decision making with variable decision times. The
other applies to static decision making with ﬁxed decision times. Most of the theoretical works,
Laibson(1997), O’Donoghue and Rabin (1999), and Dasgupta and Maskin (2005) for example, are
interested in the dynamic concept because of dynamically inconsistent behavior. I also focus on the
dynamic concept.
3in static decision making).6 In contrast, the present paper focuses on dynamic decision
making and obtains a more general relationship between risk and time preferences.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 formally deﬁnes preferences
exhibiting the Allais paradox. Section 3 deﬁnes preferences exhibiting hyperbolic and
quasi-hyperbolic discounting. Section 4 shows the theorem. Section 5 constitutes the
appendix.
2 The Allais Paradox
In this section, I consider a risk preference %r on the set of binary lotteries, deﬁned as
follows:
∆ =
{
(x;p;0;1 − p)
    x ∈ X and p ∈ [0;1]
}
;
where X is a non-degenerate closed interval on R including 0. I formally deﬁne the
common ratio eﬀect and the certainty eﬀect on the preference %r, which are typical
eﬀects of the Allais paradox. The common ratio eﬀect is characterized as follows:
Suppose that subjects choose either a safer option which gives a smaller gain x with
a higher probability ´, or a riskier option which gives a larger gain y with a lower
probability ´¹, where ¹ < 1. As ´ falls, subjects switch their choice from the safe
option to the risky option. Note that for both options, reducing ´ means increasing
the risk of getting nothing. Formally, the common ratio eﬀect is deﬁned as follows:
Definition: %r is said to exhibit the common ratio eﬀect7 if, for any x;y ∈ X and
¹; ˜ ´ ∈ [0;1] such that (x; ˜ ´) ∼r (y; ˜ ´¹),
(x;´) ≺
r (y;´¹) for all ´ ∈ (0; ˜ ´) and (x;´) ≻
r (y;´¹) for all ´ ∈ (˜ ´;1]:
This deﬁnition appears in Starmer (2000, p. 337). The general deﬁnition provided
by Machina (1982, p. 305) also becomes equivalent to the above deﬁnition within the
set of simple binary lotteries. This tendency is called the certainty eﬀect speciﬁcally
in regard to the choice between a sure option and a risky option. So the condition
characterizing the certainty eﬀect is the special case of the common ratio eﬀect, when
˜ ´ = 1:
6In the appendix, I will examine relationship between risk and time preferences in static decision
making and show a corollary which is analogous to the theorem of the present paper. The corollary
includes equivalence between the common ratio eﬀect and the common diﬀerence eﬀect.
7Under the standard assumption of monotonicity and continuity axioms, for any x;y ∈ X and
˜ ´ ∈ [0;1], there exists ¹ such that (x; ˜ ´) ∼r (y; ˜ ´¹). So the condition cannot be satisﬁed by any trivial
way.
4Definition: %r is said to exhibit the certainty eﬀect if, for any x;y ∈ X and ¹ ∈ [0;1]
such that (x;1) ∼r (y;¹),
(x;´) ≺
r (y;´¹) for all ´ ∈ (0;1]:
By deﬁnition, if a decision maker exhibits the common ratio eﬀect, then he exhibits
the certainty eﬀect.8
Finally, in the set ∆ of binary lotteries, the independence axiom reduces to the
following:
Definition: %r is said to satisfy the independence axiom if, for any x;y ∈ X and
¹;´; ˜ ´ ∈ [0;1],
(x;´) %
r (y;´¹) ⇔ (x; ˜ ´) %
r (y; ˜ ´¹):
3 The Present Bias
In this section, I deﬁne how to derive time preferences from risk preferences; I also
deﬁne preferences exhibiting hyperbolic and quasi-hyperbolic discounting. Consider a
decision maker who chooses a one-time consumption. He discounts the future goods
because it is uncertain whether or not he can consume it. To capture the uncertainty,
let p(t) be the probability that the decision maker can consume the good at a promised
time t ∈ R+. One interpretation of p(t) corresponds to the probability that the decision
maker is alive at time t.9
Consider the decision maker’s time preference %0 at time 0. The preference %0
is on the set of one-time consumptions after time 0; this set is deﬁned as T0(X) =
{
[
x;t]
    x ∈ X and t ∈ R+ such that t ≥ 0}. Suppose that the decision maker is still
alive at date d ≥ 0. Then the probability that he is still alive and able to consume
the good at date t ≥ d is the conditional probability p(t|d) = p(t)=p(d). Therefore,
0 t s
x y
d
Figure 1: Time Structure
the decision maker at time d prefers prize x at time t, denoted by [x;t], to another
8Several experimental studies on the common ratio eﬀect and the certainty eﬀect have found that
the preference is reversed by changing the prizes from gains into losses. I can deﬁne these preferences
by just switching strict preferences from ≻ to ≺, and vice versa. Henceforth, I will mention the case
of negative payoﬀs only in footnotes.
9Another interpretation of p(t), as seen in biology and psychology, is the probability that the goods
have not been stolen by other animals by time t. These two interpretations are representative of most
of the research ascribing future discounting to future uncertainty.
5future payoﬀ [y;s] if and only if he prefers the binary lottery (x;p(t|d)), which gives x
with the probability p(t|d), to the lottery (y;p(s|d)). Thus, the decision maker’s time
preferences {%d}d∈R+ for each decision time d ∈ R+, is deﬁned as follows:
Definition: For all d ∈ R+ and [x;t];[y;s] ∈ Td(X),
[x;t] %d [y;s] ⇔
(
x;p(t|d)
)
%
r (
y;p(s|d)
)
:
Henceforth, I will denote this time preferences by {%d}. I am now in a position to
deﬁne preferences exhibiting hyperbolic and quasi-hyperbolic discounting. Hyperbolic
discounting is characterized as follows: Suppose that subjects choose either an earlier,
smaller payoﬀ which gives a payoﬀ x at a date t or a later, larger payoﬀ which gives a
payoﬀ y at a date s, where x < y and t < s. Many subjects want to wait for the later,
larger payoﬀ, that is, they prefer [y;s] to [x;t]. After some time ˜ d, however, they do
not want to wait any longer, and consequently reverse their preferences as described
in Figure 2.10
0 s
y
t
x
˜ d
[x;t] ∼˜ d [y;s]
d d′
[x;t] ≺d [y;s] [x;t] ≻d′ [y;s]
Figure 2: Preferences Exhibiting Hyperbolic Discounting
Hyperbolic discounting is therefore deﬁned as follows:
Definition: {%d} is said to exhibit hyperbolic discounting if, for any x;y ∈ X and
˜ d;t;s ∈ R+ such that [x;t] ∼˜ d [y;s] and ˜ d ≤ t ≤ s,
[x;t] ≺d [y;s] for all d < ˜ d and [x;t] ≻d [y;s] for all d > ˜ d:
Note that the characterization of hyperbolic discounting in Proposition 1 of Das-
gupta and Maskin (2005, p. 1293) is exactly the same as above.
Quasi-hyperbolic discounting focuses on present-biased behavior speciﬁcally when
the promised date for the payoﬀ is close at hand. (See Laibson (1997), for example.)
Hence, the condition characterizing quasi-hyperbolic discounting is deﬁned as a special
case of hyperbolic discounting, where ˜ d = t as follows:
10In the following three deﬁnitions of time preferences, I focus on positive payoﬀs for simplicity. For
the case of negative payoﬀs, present biasness appear as procrastination and is deﬁned by the same
way just by switching strict preference from ≻ to ≺, and vice versa. O’Donoghue and Rabin (1999)
oﬀers examples of procrastination.
6Definition: {%d} is said to exhibit quasi-hyperbolic discounting if, for any x;y ∈ X
and t;s ∈ R+ such that [x;t] ∼t [y;s] and t ≤ s,
[x;t] ≺d [y;s] for all d < t:
By deﬁnition, if a decision maker exhibits hyperbolic discounting, then he exhibits
quasi-hyperbolic discounting, but the converse is not true.11
Finally, I deﬁne temporally unbiased preferences, which corresponds to exponential
discounting, as follows:
Definition: {%d} is said to be temporally unbiased if, for any x;y ∈ X and d;d′;s;t ∈
R+,
[x;t] %d [y;s] ⇔ [x;t] %d′ [y;s]:
4 The Theorem
In this section, I will prove the theorem. To establish the result, I assume a regularity
condition on future uncertainty which means that today’s good is certain, but, as
the promised date for future goods becomes increasingly distant, the probability of
consuming the good continuously decreases to zero:
Assumption 1: p(0) = 1, p is continuous and strictly decreasing, and p(∞) = 0.
Theorem: Under Assumption 1, the following three equivalences hold:12
(i) %r exhibits the common ratio eﬀect if and only if {%d} exhibits hyperbolic discount-
ing.
(ii) %r exhibits the certainty eﬀect if and only if {%d} exhibits quasi-hyperbolic dis-
counting.
(iii) %r satisﬁes the independence axiom if and only if {%d} is temporally unbiased.
The proof is in the appendix. The proof crucially relies on two structural similarities
between risky choices and intertemporal choices. One is the similarity that relates safe
outcomes to earlier ones, and risky outcomes to later ones. The other is the similarity
that relates increasing risk to moving a decision time forward as well as decreasing
risks to moving a decision time backward.
11It is easy to see the above deﬁnition is equivalent to Halevy (2008)’s characterization of quasi-
hyperbolic discounting. Halevy (2008, p. 1150) characterizes quasi-hyperbolic discounting by ∀t ∈ Z+
s.t. t ≥ 1
[
D(0)
D(1) >
D(t)
D(t+1)
]
(Diminishing Impatience).
12In the section above, I have deﬁned the Allais paradox and present bias for positive payoﬀs.
However, as I mentioned in footnote, I can deﬁne these concepts for negative payoﬀs just by switching
strict preferences. Hence, the equivalence here also holds for negative payoﬀs as well.
7As explained in detail in the introduction, the theorem of the paper may be viewed
as a generalization of most of the conventional research on hyperbolic discounting (for
example, Kagel et al. (1986), Green and Myerson (1996), Sozou (1998), Halevy (2008),
Epper et al. (2009)), because most of them adopt Assumption 1. In other words,
to obtain a relation which is not included in the theorem, it is necessary to violate
Assumption 1. As far as I know, Dasgupta and Maskin (2005) is the unique example
of such approach. They assume not only a constant Poisson mortality rate, but also
uncertainty regarding the timing of the payoﬀs. Accordingly they violate Assumption 1
and describe dynamically inconsistent behavior, despite assuming the expected utility.
The theorem may also answer the question as to what causes hyperbolic discount-
ing. There exist only three possible answers which are compatible with the theorem
presented here. The ﬁrst answer is that the Allais paradox causes hyperbolic discount-
ing ( see, for example, Halevy (2008) and Epper et al. (2009)). The second answer
is that non-regular uncertainty causes it ( see, for example, Dasgupta and Maskin
(2005)). The third answer is that a third factor may cause both the Allais paradox and
hyperbolic discounting; for example, Fudenberg and Levine (2008) claim that tempta-
tion caused by either certainty or presentness would be the common factor. The choice
among these three must await future research.
5 Appendix
5.1 Proof of The Theorem
Proof of Theorem: I will prove (i) %r exhibits the common ratio eﬀect if and only
if {%d} exhibits hyperbolic discounting for the case of positive payoﬀs. Part (ii) and
(iii) of the theorem can be proved in the same way. Analogous theorem for negative
payoﬀs also can be proved in the same way.
Step 1: If %r exhibits the common ratio eﬀect, then {%d} is hyperbolic.
Proof of Step 1: Choose any x;y ∈ X and ˜ d;t;s ∈ R+ such that [x;t] ∼˜ d [y;s]
and ˜ d ≤ t ≤ s. Then by deﬁnition, (x;p(t|˜ d)) ∼r (y;p(s|˜ d)) = (y;p(s|t)p(t|˜ d)). Fix
d < ˜ d to show [x;t] ≺d [y;s]. Since p is strictly decreasing, p(t|d) < p(t|˜ d). So the
common ratio eﬀect implies that (x;p(t|d)) ≺r (y;p(s|t)p(t|d)) = (y;p(s|d)). Then by
deﬁnition, [x;t] ≺d [y;s]. The case where d > ˜ d can be proved in the same way.
¤
Step 2: If {%d} exhibits hyperbolic discounting, then %r exhibits the common ratio
eﬀect.
Proof of Step 2: Choose any x;y ∈ X and ¹; ˜ ´ ∈ [0;1] such that (x; ˜ ´) ∼r (y; ˜ ´¹).
Fix ´ ∈ (0; ˜ ´) to show (x;´) ≺r (y;´¹). Since p is strictly decreasing bijection, there
exist t and ˜ d such that t ≥ ˜ d > 0 and p(t) = ´ and p(t|˜ d) = ˜ ´. Also, there exists
s ≥ t such that p(s|t) = ¹. Hence, (x;p(t|˜ d)) ∼r (y;p(s|t)p(t|˜ d)) = (y;p(s|˜ d)), so that
[x;t] ∼˜ d [y;s], by deﬁnition. Therefore, if {%d} is hyperbolic, then [x;t] ≺0 [y;s]. So
8the deﬁnition shows that (x;´) ≺r (y;´¹) again. The case where ´ > ˜ ´ can be proved
in same way. ¤
¥
5.2 Static Present Bias
In the section above, I focused on dynamic decision making. In this section, I will
examine static decision making. I ﬁrst deﬁne preferences exhibiting hyperbolic and
quasi-hyperbolic discounting in the static sense. Then I explore the relationship be-
tween these preferences and the preferences exhibiting the Allais paradox deﬁned in
Section 2. Most of the experimental work on time-discounting focus on the static
concept. In typical experiments, subjects are supposed to choose the earlier, smaller
payoﬀ [x;t + ®] or the later, larger payoﬀ [y;s + ®] by changing common delay ®, at
a ﬁxed decision time. Hyperbolic and quasi-hyperbolic discounting in the static sense
are deﬁned analogously to those in the dynamic sense which are deﬁned in Section 3.
The only diﬀerence is that the variable here is a common delay and the decision time
is ﬁxed at some ˜ d ∈ R+;
Definition:
(i) %˜ d is said to exhibit hyperbolic discounting in a static sense 13 if, for any x;y ∈ X
and ˜ d;t;s ∈ R+ such that [x;t] ∼˜ d [y;s] and ˜ d ≤ t ≤ s,
[x;t+®] ≺˜ d [y;s+®] for all ® ∈ (0;∞) and [x;t−®] ≻˜ d [y;s−®]for all ® ∈ [0;t− ˜ d]:
(ii) %˜ d is said to exhibit quasi-hyperbolic discounting in a static sense if, for any
x;y ∈ X and ˜ d;t;s ∈ R+ such that [x;t] ∼˜ d [y;s] and ˜ d ≤ t ≤ s,
[x;t + ®] ≺˜ d [y;s + ®] for all ® ∈ (0;∞):
(iii) %˜ d is said to be temporally unbiased in a static sense if, for any x;y ∈ X and
d; ˜ d;s;t ∈ R+ such that ˜ d ≤ t ≤ s,
[x;t] %˜ d [y;s] ⇔ [x;t + ®] %˜ d [y;s + ®] for all ® ∈ [˜ d − t;∞):
Assumption 1 must be strengthened in order to link preferences exhibiting hyper-
bolic and quasi-hyperbolic discounting in the static sense with preferences exhibiting
the Allais paradoxes:
Assumption 2: There exists a positive real number r such that p(t) = exp(−rt) for
all t ∈ R+.
13This eﬀect is often called the common diﬀerence eﬀect.
9Corollary: Under Assumption 2, the following three equivalences hold:
(i) %r exhibits the common ratio eﬀect if and only if %˜ d exhibits hyperbolic discounting
in a static sense.
(ii) %r exhibits the certainty eﬀect if and only if %˜ d exhibits quasi-hyperbolic discounting
in a static sense.
(iii) %r satisﬁes the independence axiom if and only if %˜ d is temporally unbiased in a
static sense.
Since Assumption 2 implies Assumption 1, the theorem also holds under Assump-
tion 2. Hence, each static preference is equivalent to corresponding dynamic preference.
5.3 A Counterexample to Theorem 1 of Halevy (2008)
Halevy (2008) assumes that the decision maker has rank-dependent utilities. He char-
acterizes hyperbolic discounting in terms of Diminishing Impatience:
∀t ∈ Z+ s.t. t ≥ 1
[
D(0)
D(1)
>
D(t)
D(t + 1)
]
;
where D(·) is a discount function. In his model, D(t) = ¯tg((1 − r)t), where ¯ is a
pure time-discount factor, g is a rank-dependent probability-weights function, r is a
constant hazard probability per period. In Theorem 1, Halevy (2008, p. 1150) shows
the following two equivalences: 14
Diminishing Impatience
⇔ ∀t ∈ Z+;∀r ∈ (0;1)
[
g((1 − r)t+1) > g(1 − r)g((1 − r)t)
]
⇔ ∀p;q ∈ (0;1)
[
g(pq) > g(p)g(q)
]
.
Then Halevy (2008) cites Segal (1987a, b). Let "g(p) =
g′(p)p
g(p) be the elasticity of g.
∀p;q ∈ (0;1)
[
g(pq) > g(p)g(q)
]
⇔ "g(p)is strictly increasing
⇔ Common Ratio Eﬀect;
where the ﬁrst equivalence is claimed in Lemma 4.1 of Segal (1987a) and the second
one is proved by Theorem 1 of Segal (1987b). However, in the proof of Lemma 4.1,
Segal (1987a) implicitly assumes that "g(p) is monotone.
14The “only if” part (⇒) of the second equivalence may need some additional condition on g. To
explain the point, suppose that g((1 − r)t+1) > g(1 − r)g((1 − r)t) for all t ∈ Z+;r ∈]0;1[. Fix p > q.
If we let 1−r = p, then it should hold that (1−r)t = q for some t ∈ R. However, it is not necessarily
true that t ≡ log(1¡r) p is an integer. Hence, it is not necessarily true that g(pq) > g(p)g(q). We
may eliminate the problem by extending the model into continuous time. However, the deﬁnition of
diminishing impatience would no longer be an appropriate description of quasi-hyperbolic preferences.
Since, in continuous time, the “ next” period of period t is no longer period t+1, it would be diﬃcult
to interpret the ratio
D(t)
D(t+1) as the impatience at the period t.
10Indeed, a probability-weights function g of prospect theory, proposed in Kahneman
and Tversky (1992), satisﬁes g(pq) > g(p)g(q) for all p;q ∈ (0;1), but "g(p) is strictly
decreasing on some interval. Hence, only this partial result of Halevy (2008) is true:
Diminishing Impatience ⇐ Common Ratio Eﬀect:
Actually, this result is implied by the “only if” component of part (ii) of the theorem
in the present paper.
The following is the function g proposed in Kahneman and Tversky (1992). Let
a ∈ [0;1]. For all p ∈ [0;1], deﬁne
g(p) =
pa
(pa + (1 − p)a)1=a:
Claim: For a = 0:5, rank-dependent decision maker with the above probability-weights
function g exhibits the diminishing impatience but does not exhibit the common ratio
eﬀect.
Camerer and Ho (1994) estimate the parameter a as 0:52 based on their experi-
ments, so a = 0:5 would be a reasonable estimate. The above claim is true for other
parameters too, such as 0:4;0:9.15
Step 1: The decision maker exhibits the diminishing impatience.
Proof of Step 1: I will show that ∀p;q ∈ (0;1)
[
g(pq) > g(p)g(q)
]
. For all p;q ∈
[0;1], deﬁne
f(p;q) = g(pq) − g(p)g(q):
I will show that f(p;q) > 0 for all p;q ∈ (0;1). Choose any b ∈ (0;1) to show that
f(p;b − p) > 0 for all p ∈ (0;b). By the symmetry of f, without loss of generality, it
suﬃces to show that f(p;b − p) > 0 for all p ∈ (0; b
2). By calculation,
df(p;b−p)
dp =
dg(p(b−p))
dp −
dg(p)g(b−p)
dp
= g′(p(b − p))(b − 2p) − g′(p)g(b − p) + g′(b − p)g(p):
For a = 0:5, it can be shown that the derivative is 0 if and only if p = b
2. Since
f(b
2; b
2) > f(0;b) = 0, then f attains its maximum when p = b
2 and its minimum when
p = 0. Hence, f(p;b − p) > 0 for all p ∈ (0; b
2)
¤
Step 2: The decision maker does not exhibit the common ratio eﬀect.
Proof of Step 2: By Segal (1987 b), it suﬃces to show that "g(p) is strictly decreas-
ing for all p < 0:14. By calculation,
"
′
g(p) =
(1 − p)−2+a((1 − p)ap − apa + p1+a)
p((1 − p)a + pa)2 :
15However, the claim does not hold when a is too small.
11Hence, for a = 0:5,
"g(p) is strictly decreasing ⇔ p
√
1 − p − :5
√
p + p
√
p < 0
⇐ p < 0:14:
¤
¥
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